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Abstract Research into IMF program implementation has usually taken the form of
large sample regression analyses. A more detailed explanation is offered in this
paper through a case study of program implementation in Turkey between 1999 and
2004. Our research is based on a series of in-depth interviews with policy makers,
program negotiators, bureaucrats, interest groups and IMF personnel. Our results
reinforce hypotheses that emerge from the theory of implementation and the large
sample econometric work, but they also offer new and enhanced explanations.
Program implementation depends on a range of factors which interact with one
another. These include domestic political economy factors, such as the importance of
special interest groups, political cohesiveness and program ownership by the
government and the IMF, but also other idiosyncratic factors such as, in the case of
Turkey, the existence of a crisis, the desire to join the EU and the role of influential
technocrats. Our research has implications for the design of IMF programs.
Keywords IMF programs . Conditionality . Implementation . Turkey .
Political economy of implementation
JEL Classification F33 . E61 . E65
1 Introduction
Increasing attention has been paid to the implementation of IMF programs rather than
just the conditionality they embody. Part of this research has been theoretical and part
of it has been empirical. The theoretical research has focused on the role of special
interest groups or veto players, arguing that they may be able to disrupt the
implementation of policy (see, for example, Drazen 2002, but also Grossman and
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Helpman 2001; Khan and Sharma 2000; Mayer and Mourmouras 2004, 2008, and
Tsebelis 2001a and 2001b). The empirical research has taken the form of large sample
regression analyses (see, for example, Ivanova et al. 2003; Dreher 2003; Joyce 2006,
and Arpac et al. 2008). It has revealed mixed results although it has identified various
domestic political economy factors as being generally significant determinants of
implementation, alongside economic characteristics such as openness.
A shortcoming of the research up until now, however, is that it has been rather
broad and non-specific in its approach. The empirical work has also been
constrained by the availability of data. The implication of this is that while an
indication of the factors affecting implementation has been assembled, a more
detailed explanation is still missing. Putting together such an explanation requires a
different methodological approach that is based on in-depth structured case studies.
Over time it will be by amassing these that a more rounded and fuller understanding
of implementation will be achieved. However, it is important that the case study
methodology is informed by the relevant theory and by existing large sample
research, so that it is seen as a complementary rather than a competing methodology.
This paper takes a step in this direction by reporting on a detailed examination of
the implementation of IMF programs in Turkey over the period from 1980 to 2004,
but with particular attention being paid to 1999–2004. Turkey is chosen because of
its long history of involvement with the IMF (see Table 1) and the diverse pattern of
Table 1 Arrangements with the IMF: 1948–2005
Date Cancellation Number
of Months
Amount
(SDR Millions)
Disbursed
(SDR Millions)
Disbursement
rate (%)
Arrangement
type
1948 12 5 5 100 Gold tranche
1953 12 10 10 100 Gold tranche
1954 12 20 20 100 Gold tranche
1957 12 13.5 13.5 100 Gold tranche
1958 12 25 25 100 Gold tranche
1 1961 12 37.5 16 42.6 Stand-By
2 1962 9 31 15 48.4 Stand-By
3 1963 11 21.5 21.5 100 Stand-By
4 1964 11 21.5 19 88.4 Stand-By
5 1965 12 21.5 0 0 Stand-By
6 1966 12 21.5 21.5 100 Stand-By
7 1967 11 27 27 100 Stand-By
8 1968 9 27 27 100 Stand-By
9 1969 12 27 10 37 Stand-By
10 1970 12 90 90 100 Stand-By
11 1978 1979 24 300 90 3 Stand-By
12 1979 1980 12 250 230 92 Stand-By
13 1980 36 1,250 1,250 100 Stand-By
14 1983 12 225 56.3 25 Stand-By
15 1984 1984 12 225 169 75 Stand-By
16 1994 1996 14 610 460 75 Stand-By
17 1999 36 1,5038 11,738 78 Stand-By
and SRF
18 2002 36 12,821 11,914 92.9 Stand-By
19 2005 36 6,662 Continuing Stand-By
Source: IMF Annual Reports (2000–2004), Ekzen (1980), Egilmez (2005)
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implementation that has been exhibited. Our methodological approach is one not
often used by economists, although frequently used by other social scientists.
Having formulated some hypotheses on the basis of the extant theoretical and
empirical research, and having formed views from examining the available statistical
evidence and the literature, we undertook a series of lengthy interviews with those
involved in the programs (a schedule of interview participants is provided in
Appendix A). These included key Turkish politicians, bureaucrats, the leaders of
special interest groups and relevant IMF personnel including mission chiefs and
resident representatives. We also consulted academic experts on Turkey, in particular
to check their perception of the validity of the conclusions we drew and to try and
ensure that we had not overlooked anything that was important.
Although our approach is essentially qualitative, we do attempt to offer some
quantification of the importance of the individual determinants that our research
identifies. We also attempt to anticipate the criticism that case studies are limited in their
usefulness because the results that emerge from them cannot be generalized. We do this
by relating our results to the existing large sample cross country regression research.
The paper is organized in the followingway. Section2 is a broad summary of the large
sample research on program implementation. In Section 3, we explore Turkey’s record
in terms of the incidence of IMF programs, and the record of economic policy and
performance from 1980 to 2004. This examination enables us to offer some
commentary on what seemed to be going on. It provides the contextual framework
for what follows. Section 4 summarizes the views of those who we interviewed.
However, rather than simply recording what they had to say, we arrange our discussion
around some of the key factors that have been identified by the theoretical research into
implementation and by the large sample regression analyses. Section 5 presents a
quantitative summary of the qualitative views, and also examines the extent to which the
findings may be generalized across a sample of other countries. It also investigates the
policy implications of our findings. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Large Sample Evidence on Program Implementation
A mixed picture emerges from the literature assessing the determinants of IMF
program implementation. A range of economic and political factors has been
included in estimations as suggested by the theoretical studies of implementation.
We do not review the literature in detail here since we have carried out this exercise
elsewhere (see Arpac et al. 2008). However in Table 2 we present a brief summary
of the major empirical findings that emerge from the existing literature and it is upon
these that the current paper builds. While, most studies of program implementation
concur that political factors are important in influencing implementation, there is a
disagreement about the precise nature of the political influence. Arpac et al. (2008)
find that program interruptions are associated with the strength of domestic interest
groups using the World Bank’s veto players measure, while conventionally used
measures of special interest groups generate insignificant results (Dreher 2003; Joyce
2006). The political cohesion variable is found to be significant by Ivanova et al.
(2003) but not by Joyce (2006). Also, Ivanova et al. (2003), Joyce (2006) and
Dreher (2003) find that the degree of democracy is statistically significant.
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Turning to the macroeconomic dimension of implementation, earlier studies of
implementation attribute poor compliance to unfavorable initial and external
macroeconomic conditions (Edwards 1989; Polak 1991; Killick 1995; Mecagni
1999). More recent studies by Joyce (2006) and Arpac et al. (2008) find that
program implementation depends on the openness of economies as proxied by the
volume of trade.1 The econometric evidence also suggests that the IMF can affect
implementation through the amount of financial assistance it stands ready to provide
(Killick 1995; Nsouli et al. 2004; Arpac et al. 2008).
3 Policy, Performance and Programs: Turkey and the IMF
Having had a sequence of programs with the IMF since 1964 (see Table 1), Turkey
began to implement what might be seen as neo-liberalist reforms under the auspices
of the IMF and the World Bank in 1980. Eliminating current account payments
imbalances and reducing the rate of inflation were, however, the immediate targets
of the IMF programs. The principal policy instruments for achieving these targets
were monetary contraction, exchange rate devaluation and the liberalization of key
prices, such as interest rates on bank deposits. IMF programs sought to lay the
foundations for sustained economic growth by reforming the financial sector and
liberalizing foreign trade (Onis 1986; Onis and Ozmucur 1988).2
Although in the early 1980s there was a reasonably close correspondence between
the views of the IMF and those of Turkish policy makers as to what reforms were
necessary, improving economic performance meant that the Turkish authorities no
longer saw the need for IMF programs after 1984. However, by the end of the 1980s
the momentum for reform was declining. Distributional pressures that had been
largely repressed during the early 1980s re-asserted themselves and were manifested
in larger fiscal deficits. Accompanied by high real rates of interest, these were
financed by capital inflows which were facilitated by a liberalized capital account
and the convertibility of the Turkish lira. By the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was
adopting a vulnerable path of debt-led economic growth.
Heavy borrowing by the government resulted in commercial banks holding short
positions in foreign currencies. In order to finance their purchases of government
bonds, the banks borrowed short term from international capital markets pledging
the bonds as collateral. With inadequate risk management, the banking sector
became progressively more exposed. However, in the context of a highly fragmented
political system, successive coalition governments lacked either the incentives or the
capacity to undertake fiscal reform and to regulate the banking sector. Instead,
2 A comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s development experience is beyond the scope of this paper. There
is a vast literature on the economic development of Turkey. See, among others, Boratav (2003) and Yeldan
(2001).
1 Openness may be affected by both structural factors such as country size and policy related measures
such as tariffs. Countries with high tariffs may find it more difficult to implement the fiscal component of
IMF programs, as they rely on this form of tax revenue. This makes it problematic to disentangle the
connection between trade policy and implementation, as there are various measures of outward
orientation, but they are not correlated (Pritchett 1996). Therefore, the volume of trade proxy is generally
adopted in the literature.
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frequently elected on a populist agenda, they allowed government expenditure to rise
and fiscal and current account deficits to widen. The situation was only sustainable
for as long as foreign capital flowed in. There was, in short, a financial crisis waiting
to happen.3
It arrived in early 1994 when Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s reduced Turkey’s
credit rating. As the lira’s value depreciated, the government was driven to the IMF
for assistance. A fourteen month Stand-By Arrangement, signed in April 1994, was
built around a large, front-end loaded fiscal correction combined with a tighter
stance on monetary policy. Initially the program’s implementation was satisfactory,
and it was extended. But in September, 1995, the governing coalition collapsed and
elections were called. In the resulting political turmoil the IMF program went off
course and the final review of it was never completed. The underlying
macroeconomic disequilibria continued to worsen and the fragmented political
system, incorporating a powerful populist element, did not allow fundamental
economic reform to be carried through. Towards the end of the 1990s, however, the
economic costs of populism and the sustainability of contemporary policies were
being reassessed by policy makers.
In July, 1998, a Staff Monitoring Program had been agreed with the IMF and this
was followed, after the general election in April, 1999, by a Stand-By Arrangement
in December, 1999. The new coalition government incorporating the left nationalist
Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit, the radical
nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) under Devlet Bahceli and the right of
centre Motherland Party under Mesut Yilmaz, seemed committed to implementing a
far-reaching program of disinflation and structural reform involving taxation reform,
privatization, banking regulation and the phasing out of agricultural price support.
The program was ambitious, aiming to bring inflation down to 25 percent by the end
of 2000, 12 percent by the end of 2001 and to 7 percent by the end of 2002. A tight fiscal
policy, an incomes policy in line with targeted inflation, and monetary policy formulated
in line with decelerating inflation, formed the basis of the program. It also incorporated a
crawling exchange rate regime. This envisaged a gradual and smooth transition to a
flexible exchange rate after the first critical 18 months.
The Turkish lira was allowed to depreciate gradually until 2003, against a
currency basket made up of the US dollar and the euro. In essence, Turkey sought to
implement a system akin to a currency board, but in the context of a currency that
was depreciating in a pre-announced fashion.
The program started well amidst considerable optimism for success. The
endorsement of Turkey’s candidacy for full membership of the European Union at
the Helsinki summit in December, 1999, at the same time as the IMF agreement was
launched, provided a powerful incentive for undertaking both political and economic
reforms. Throughout 2000, exchange rate depreciation followed the envisaged
schedule and the Central Bank successfully controlled the expansion of the monetary
base by constraining its net domestic asset position. During 2000, the quantitative
performance criteria were met. However, whilst the government appeared to display
an initial commitment to the fiscal component of the program, this commitment
3 For a detailed account of economic crises in Turkey, see Onis and Rubin (2003) and Akyuz and Boratav
(2003).
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ultimately proved to be less than total. In spite of agreeing not to do so, the
government progressively relied on ‘extra budgetary’ ways of financing government
expenditure which were free from parliamentary supervision and control. Although
the coalition government had initially displayed a unified front, it soon became
apparent that it lacked the necessary cohesion and commitment to maintain the
reform process. Serious conflicts arose during the year between the Nationalist
Action Party and its partners over key aspects of structural reform. In particular, the
Nationalist Action Party opposed reducing agricultural subsidies on the grounds that
it would have undesirable effects on income distribution, and, in particular, on the
rural poor from whom the party gained much of its support. It also opposed the sale
of state assets in telecommunications on the grounds of the strategic importance of
the industry.
The formation of the Bank Regulation and Supervision Authority (BRSA) also
proved to be an area of difficulty. The Board of the BSRA was supposed to be
named by the end of March 2000 in order for it to become fully operational by
August and to comply with one of the IMF’s structural benchmarks. However, by the
end of August, the members had only just been appointed. Furthermore, the ability
of the Authority to play a constructive regulatory role was severely hampered by the
resistance of private banking lobbies. Bank regulation also faced resistance from
politicians and some policy makers who perceived private banks as an important
source of financing for the fiscal deficit and public banks as a modality for building
up and sustaining electoral support. As a consequence the banking legislation was
initially watered down.
By the autumn of 2000, market confidence in the program was seriously waning.
Structural benchmarks were being missed and the government appeared to be back
tracking on structural reform. In the absence of strong political endorsement, it was
left to the governor of the Central Bank to defend the program. The government
displayed little ownership of it. With a boom in consumption fostered by low interest
rates and an increasing current account deficit, Turkey became vulnerable to a
sudden capital outflow, especially as international capital markets became more risk
averse in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis in 1997/98.
Confidence was further undermined in September 2000 when some former bank
owners were accused of ‘organized crime’ and in November 2000 when the BRSA
encouraged banks to reduce their open positions by the end of the year.4 A
tightening liquidity situation led to the failure of the medium sized Demirbank and to
rising interest rates. Fear of a liquidity crisis then encouraged the Central Bank to
relax monetary policy which in turn put pressure on the exchange rate as capital
rapidly flowed out of the country. On the last day of November the Central Bank
declared that it would respect the NDA limits in an attempt to staunch the decline in
reserves, and in the days that followed overnight market interest rates reached over
2,000 percent. However, the capital outflow only abated when the IMF package was
announced at the end of December. The Demirbank was taken over by the BSRA
and the government issued credit guarantees to underwrite the banks. Supplemented
with resources from the Supplemental Reserve Facility, the IMF provided SDR
4 For detailed analysis of the problems associated with open positions and the links to the crises, see Alper
(2001).
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15 billion of financial assistance in total. This allowed reserves to be replenished and
calmed markets for a while. But market confidence remained low, and Turkey
remained vulnerable to a further economic and financial crisis.
On February 19, 2001, Prime Minister Ecevit disclosed that he had had a serious
dispute with President Sezer during a meeting of the National Security Council, and
that, as a result, the country was in a ‘political crisis’. The dispute related to the
President’s concerns about weak bank supervision and, as he saw it, the Govern-
ment’s inadequate measures against corruption among public officials. There
followed a major speculative attack on the lira and another liquidity squeeze.
However, unlike the November crisis, this time the Central Bank refused to act as a
lender of last resort. Overnight rates rose to more than 4,000 percent. When, in
February, two public banks announced that they were unable to meet their lira
obligations to other banks, the interbank system broke down. On February 23, the
government floated the lira. The experiment with exchange rate based stabilization
had come to an end.
The February 2001 crisis constituted the deepest economic crisis ever faced by
Turkey. Moreover, it affected all sectors of society. It demonstrated the shortcomings
of patronage networks, and further eroded the general public’s trust in politicians and
the political system.5 The Central Bank governor and the Undersecretary of the
Treasury resigned, and the government appointed Kemal Dervis from the World
Bank as Minister of Economic Affairs, giving him the responsibility of defusing the
crisis. Dervis was originally offered the position of Central Bank governor, but
argued that “only a minister of economic affairs with strong co-ordinating powers
would have any chance of succeeding.” (Dervis 2005, p. 86).
As well as holding his Treasury position, Dervis was given the responsibilities of
co-ordinating the Central Bank and the BSRA, and of negotiating with the IMF and
World Bank. But he was not given any authority over key ministries since each
coalition party wanted to retain some control over economic management.
Dervis formed a core team including the new governor of the Central Bank,
Sureyya Serdengecti, the Undersecretary of the Treasury, Faik Oztrak, and the new
head of the BRSA, Engin Akcakoca. The team prepared a new national program
based on strict fiscal control and front-end loaded structural reforms. On May 15,
Dervis submitted a new ‘Letter of Intent’ to the IMF and announced the ‘Strong
Economy Program’ aimed at transforming ‘the old ways of policy making’ (Letter of
Intent, May 2001, p. 1).
The same government that had overseen two major economic crises now played
an instrumental role in passing a record number of laws. In less than a year nineteen
laws or regulations relating to structural reform were passed. The most important of
these granted independence to the Central Bank, reformed the banking system,
overhauled agricultural policy (moving from price support to income support) and
sought to control public debt. They also covered the civil aviation, telecommuni-
cations, tobacco and sugar industries as well as the regulation of public procurement.
5 For contrasting interpretations of the reasons underlying the crises of 2000 and 2001, see Akyuz and
Boratav (2003) and Cizre and Yeldan (2005), which place the blame on the IMF for failing to prevent the
crisis in the context of the ongoing programs. Others such as Onis and Rubin (2003), take into account the
domestic political constraints and poor government ownership.
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Nevertheless, resistance to reform had not disappeared altogether. Major clashes
occurred between Dervis and the Nationalist Action Party, key members of the
coalition, over a number of issues including telecommunications, where the
Nationalist Action Party wanted to maintain control by selecting four members of
the seven person board. In particular the clash between Dervis and the Transport
Minister, Enis Oksuz, led to delay in the release of the IMF loan. However, in post-
crisis conditions, the views of the IMF proved decisive in overcoming resistance and
the episode ended with the resignation of Oksuz. The IMF’s First Deputy Managing
Director, Stanley Fischer, observed at the time that:
“Turkey has already made impressive progress in implementing this very
ambitious program: it has undertaken important banking sector and other
structural reforms, continued strong fiscal adjustment despite difficult economic
circumstances and carried out an extensive legislative agenda.”
But the very success of the program bred further difficulties and, in August 2002,
Dervis himself resigned, sensing increasing strains within the coalition government.
The November 2002 elections saw members of the coalition government being
penalized by the electorate for the economic crisis. This paved the way for the
emergence of a new political party with Islamist roots but a moderate outlook, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which went on to take centre stage in Turkish
politics. As a single party majority government, and contrary to some concerns that
it would indulge in a new round of populist expansion, deviating from the IMF
program, the AKP adopted a strong reformist stance. Capitalizing on its broad-based
political support, the new government was able to continue to implement the Strong
Economy Program. Tight fiscal discipline was accomplished. Inflation was not only
stabilized in single digits, but this was achieved within the context of economic
growth, which in turn allowed the debt-GNP ratio to fall.
4 Interpreting the Record on Implementation: The Views of Participants
In this section, we examine Turkey’s relationship with the IMF over the period
1999–2004 in more detail, with a view to both testing the theories of policy
implementation and examining the extent to which the qualitative evidence is
consistent with the findings from large sample regression analyses. A time line of
key events is provided in Appendix B, and Table 3 provides a summary of the main
economic indicators in Turkey over the period. Our methodology was to undertake a
series of structured interviews with those involved in the process, including leading
domestic politicians, bureaucrats and other domestic policy makers, those represent-
ing special interest groups and IMF officials involved in the programs. The
structured interviews included questions on participants’ views on program
negotiation and implementation with a particular emphasis being placed on factors
suggested by the literature, such as macroeconomic conditions, domestic policy and
external constraints. In addition, numerous additional factors, which interacted with
the above variables, were discovered through the interviews.
We attempted, as far as was possible, to cover a reasonably representative and
balanced sample of participants. The purpose was to assemble a richer and more
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nuanced explanation of implementation than is provided by large sample studies.
However, in order to create an analytical framework for our discussion, and as noted
above, we based our investigation on the factors that are suggested both by theory
and by cross country regression analysis. In Appendix Awe summarize the schedule
of interviews we undertook.
4.1 Special Interest Groups
Political parties in Turkey have often acted as patronage networks serving narrowly
based sectional interests. The power of special interest groups therefore constrained
policy implementation. For instance, Carlo Cottarelli, IMF mission chief to Turkey
during the 1999 program, attributed delays in banking reform to the existence of a
strong banking lobby that was opposed to it. He points out that,
“The pressure was on the government not to do anything before 2001. The
tackling of problems in the banking system was delayed and delayed, clearly
because of the banking sector’s resistance to reforms and because of the
difficulty the government had in acknowledging that public sector money was
to be used to bail out the failing banks.”
According to Sumer Oral, the former Minister of Finance, the government’s role
had to balance the demands of special interest groups with those of the IMF.
Economic circumstances determined where the balance lay. During the autumn of
2000 the balance was in favor of the interest groups and there were delays in
implementing IMF-backed policies. After the February 2001 crisis, the ability of
special interest groups to slow down the pace of reform was significantly
diminished. Indeed in severe crisis conditions they themselves stood to lose.
As Kemal Dervis, Minister of Economic Affairs, points out,
“The industrialists and the bankers would have had great losses had the
economy sunk totally. People who invested in the country were hoping that
the program would offer an exit. Some of them were against some parts of the
program. For instance, businessmen were initially against the free float. But
there was overall support.”
Faik Oztrak, who was Undersecretary of the Treasury, agreed. According to him,
the economic crisis forced special interest groups to back the government. It was
only when the program started to show good results that they began to reaffirm their
sectional interests.
Dervis observed that in the crisis, there was little option other than to implement
the program favored by the IMF. The single exception, according to him, was
organized labor; a fear of social upheaval led the government to resist the IMF’s
preferred wages policy.
In the absence of a severe crisis things were different. Juha Kahkonen, who took
over from Cottarelli as IMF mission chief, attributed slippages in structural reform to
the “pressure of the special interest groups” quoting the delays in privatization and
banking sector reform as examples.
Hugh Bredenkamp, the IMF Resident Representative to Turkey, argued that even
the AKP government succumbed to special interest groups to a degree. By raising
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tax rates in one sector and reducing them in another the government tried to maintain
support from key constituencies, whereas the IMF favored a broad based tax regime.
4.2 Weak Institutions
There was general agreement amongst those we interviewed that poor implemen-
tation was associated with weak institutions that were open to political influence. As
both Oral and Kahkonen stressed, weak institutions made programs vulnerable to
slippage. One difficulty was, of course, that institutional reform was itself a part of
the programs. It was the severe crisis in 2001 that provided the needed impetus to
institutional reform.
Perhaps the most striking institutional reform related to the BSRA. Although set
up in 1999, prior to the onset of the crisis, it was initially largely ineffective. Engin
Akcakoca, who became its head, explained the demands of the banking sector as
follows,
“The banking sector did not want harsh regulation, and they wanted less money
leaving their pockets. There was a big gap between what the sector wanted and
what the Banking Agency and the IMF wanted.”
However, in the aftermath of the February 2001 crisis, the power and autonomy
of the BSRA increased significantly, even though politicians remained rather
reluctant to cede control to it. As Akcakoca observed,
“The government was not used to independent agencies. They wanted to solve
problems on their own, out of habit. The banking agency had to warn them
against this and, of course, there were reactions from the sector. But once the
bankrupted banks were taken out of the system and the remaining ones got
stronger, they saw that what had been done was good.”
4.3 Political Cohesion and Ownership
For much of the time covered by our study, the coalition government exhibited
severe divisions which made it difficult to implement any one overall strategy. As
Oral argues,
“There was a government coalition with three parties with quite different
perspectives on how the economy should be run. This sort of government could
not execute a single-handed economic implementation.”
While, in December 1999, the coalition government had been under significant
external pressure to put in place a Fund-backed program, not all coalition partners
shared a lasting commitment to reform. Cottarelli observed that the support for the
program gradually lapsed during 2000, noting that,
“At the beginning, fiscal tightening was in place and a series of reforms were
implemented. There was a strong backing for the program by the politicians. At
the end of 1999, everyone supported it. Weakening of will to implement
appeared as we went through 2000. The main issue was the difficulty to
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respond promptly to developments such as speed of decrease in inflation and
sharp recovery. Inflation was declining to levels that were never seen in Turkey
for a long time. It became politically difficult to keep going as things got better.
It wasn’t fatigue. It was the impression that they had already won the football
match. Although there were people who did say that this was not a 100 m race
but a marathon.”
Gazi Ercel, who was the Governor of the Central Bank at the time, asserts that
even at the beginning of the program there was not enough commitment on the part
of the government. According to him there was, “only half hearted commitment
which was galvanized by the prospect of joining the EU. The prime minister for a
start did not believe that the program would achieve what he wanted most; growth.”
Even after the February 2001 crisis, the political ownership of the program was
never complete. The reforms were pushed through by a group of technocrats in the
absence of political cohesion. Kemal Dervis observed that, “to what degree a
government existed, that could be discussed even.”
Undersecretary of the Treasury Oztrak maintained that politicians only owned
certain parts of the program and were prepared to blame bureaucrats and the IMF for
the other parts.
With the election of the majority AKP government, a stronger political
commitment to the IMF program emerged. Bredenkamp argues that improving
economic performance also induced further commitment—something that had not
happened with the coalition governments. In any case, and according to him, the
AKP government knew that a healthy economy was its biggest asset, pointing out
that, “the only thing they could do was not mess things up and not allow the
economy to deteriorate.”
Also in the aftermath of the February 2001 crisis, there was a strong desire country-
wide and across all sections of society to take whatever measures were necessary to
avoid similar crises again. This provided the government with more political space to
implement policy reform than had existed before. As Oztrak observes,
“Everyone was scared of what had happened, and was ready to give in to
anyone with a solution. That is why structural reforms were front-loaded to take
advantage of the crisis scare, while everyone is on the same side as the pro
reform coalition.”
4.4 The Scale and Nature of IMF Support
While the scale of financial support from the IMF was very modest in the case of the
1999 program, it was much greater in 2001, significantly exceeding quota limits.
Cottarelli maintains that the limited resources in 1999 dictated a program that was
perhaps over-ambitious in what it set out to achieve, aiming “to bring Turkey out of
recession, while trying to eliminate inflation.” He argues that it was the lack of
severity of the economic situation in 1999, the absence of a pronounced balance of
payments problem, combined with the Fund’s reluctance to be accused of ‘bailing
out’ the banks that made the Fund unwilling to provide more resources. The stronger
financial support in 2001 made the IMF’s position more influential, but also created
more policy discretion. Both Dervis and Kahkonen attribute the successful
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implementation of the program, in part, to the amount of finance supplied by the
Fund.
Of course, another part of the story looks behind the amount of IMF lending. In
1999, many of the IMF’s most powerful member countries had become concerned
about the size of the Fund’s involvement in East Asia in 1997/98. By 2001, and in
the aftermath of 9/11, the international political environment had changed radically
and worked to the advantage of Turkey in its dealings with the IMF. The US in
particular was keen to support a geo-politically important ally. Participants in the
programs also agree that in the case of the 2001 program there was ‘mutual
confidence’, which Dervis suggests is the most important ingredient for a successful
reform program. He argues that,
“The domestic policy makers must believe that the IMF team is sincerely trying
to find the best solutions, is highly competent, and is trying to maximize
financial support. And the IMF team must believe that the domestic team is not
playing games and will do its best to implement what is agreed.”
Akcakoca concurs, asserting that the IMF team was flexible and open to
persuasion.
“When teams disagree, if they try to come to a solution by arguing, tension
mounts and subjectivity starts to surface. The result is reciprocal stubbornness.
There are examples of failed programs in the history for such reasons. During
our term, we introduced two technocrat teams to each other, created social
space. They saw that the Turkish team wasn’t trying to be stubborn, and we saw
that they hadn’t come to bankrupt our banks. Everyone was there to do their
job. We were in the same boat. If the program did not work, everyone’s seat
was in danger.”
4.5 Initial Conditions
In principle, the severity of initial conditions prior to the negotiation of an IMF program
might work either way. From one point of view, where the problems are less severe there
is less to achieve and there is therefore likely to be more success in achieving it. On the
other hand, it may require a severe economic crisis to alter entrenched attitudes and to
overcome sectional interests. Experience in Turkey is more consistent with the second
relationship. The 2001 crisis highlighted the deficiencies of previous policies and
created a conducive environment for change. Dervis saw the crisis as motivating the
accelerating pace of reform, explaining it as follows.
“The severity and extent of the crisis gave us only two choices, either to
implement a program encompassing serious structural transformation and
macroeconomic stabilization, or to accept a moratorium. A deep loss of
confidence in the government and the entire political system was present. The
crisis provided a unique opportunity to push reforms through parliament that
otherwise might have taken years to enact. There is an argument against selling
the precious political capital all at once and instead to advance step by step,
building required coalitions a few at a time. But a severe crisis creates a
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different situation. The need for reform is more urgent and a message of change
also needs to be given for markets to respond to.”
Other political leaders in Turkey we interviewed, as well as those on the IMF
team, agreed with this sentiment. Oral pointed out that while the conditionality
included in IMF programs did not change, the crisis unambiguously revealed the
need for the policies to be carried through. Kahkonen claims that good use was made
of the opportunity for reform and Bredenkamp identifies a virtuous circle as
economic recovery allowed the AKP government to show that the policies were
working; this re-enforced their commitment to continued economic reform.
4.6 Other Factors: Europe and Influential Technocrats (the Dervis Effect)
Those interviewed by us pointed to two other factors as assisting the implementation
of IMF programs in Turkey. The first was the longer term objective of joining the
European Union and the perception that this was attainable. This provided a further
incentive to pursue economic policies that were deemed to be sound and consistent
with those of EU members. These included disciplined fiscal policy as well as
structural reform. The satisfactory implementation of IMF programs was seen by
some as a prerequisite for eventual EU membership. The 2001 crisis also enhanced
the desire to join the EU and therefore indirectly created greater impetus for reform.
Finally there is little doubt that Kemal Dervis was instrumental in orchestrating
the implementation of the IMF programs in which he was involved. With experience
of the Washington-based international financial institutions, he was in a strong
position to act as a mediator. He carried the confidence of both the domestic policy
makers and the IMF and was therefore able to extract the most from each of them.
The IMF viewed him as “not your usual politician” and as being able to deliver on
policy reform. Dervis describes his role in the following way.
“There was a pro-reform bureaucracy already in existence and they were
waiting for all these reforms. My contribution was to bring them together as a
coherent whole. I haven’t invented any of them on my own. I was making sure
the reforms were consistent, and their timings were right. One of my jobs was
to convince politicians on the necessity of implementing reforms. My other
function was resource mobilization, to find the necessary financing needs of the
country during the crisis.”
5 Discussion and Policy Implications
In an attempt to offer some quantification of what is qualitative evidence, we
analyzed the frequency with which particular factors were mentioned by those we
interviewed (see Table 4 and Fig. 1). The structured interviews were designed to
reflect the determinants of program implementation that have been suggested by the
literature. The relative significance of the variables was determined according to the
number of times each variable was cited by participants. We did not distinguish
between whether the interviewee was a domestic politician, or an official, or a
member of IMF staff while quantifying our results (though we offer an analysis of
Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation 149
T
ab
le
4
T
he
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
’
ev
al
ua
tio
n
of
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
IM
F
St
af
f
B
ur
ea
uc
ra
ts
Sp
ec
ia
lI
nt
er
es
tG
ro
up
s
Va
ri
ab
le
s
A
ffe
ct
in
g
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
K
em
al
D
er
vi
s-
M
in
is
te
ro
f
E
co
no
m
ic
al
A
ff
ai
rs
(1
8t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
Su
m
er
O
ra
l-
M
in
is
te
r
of
Fi
na
nc
e
(1
7t
h
an
d
18
th
St
an
d-
B
y)
C
ar
lo
C
ot
ta
re
lli
-
M
is
si
on
C
hi
ef
(1
7t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
Ju
ha
K
ah
ko
ne
n-
M
is
si
on
C
hi
ef
(1
8t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
H
ug
h
B
re
de
nk
am
p-
R
es
id
en
t
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e
(1
8t
h
an
d
19
th
St
an
d-
B
y)
G
az
iE
rc
el
-
G
ov
er
no
r
of
th
e
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
(1
7t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
Fa
ik
O
zt
ra
k-
U
nd
er
se
cr
et
ar
y
of
Tr
ea
su
ry
(1
8t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
E
ng
in
A
kc
ak
oc
a-
H
ea
d
of
B
R
SA
(1
8t
h
St
an
d-
B
y)
B
ay
ra
m
M
er
al
-
L
ea
de
r
of
L
ab
or
U
ni
on
C
on
fe
de
ra
tio
n
In
iti
al
E
co
n.
Fa
ct
or
s
–
+
–
C
ri
si
s
+
+
+
+
+
+
(A
m
bi
tio
us
)
Pr
og
ra
m
D
es
ig
n
–
–
th
en
+
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
E
xt
er
na
l
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t
+
+
th
en
–
E
U
C
ri
te
ri
a
+
+
U
S
Su
pp
or
t
+
IM
F
C
om
m
itm
en
t
+
–
–
+
+
Si
ze
of
IM
F
L
oa
n
–
–
th
en
+
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
&
C
om
m
itm
en
t
+
th
en
–
+
+
th
en
–
–
+
th
en
–
C
ou
nt
ry
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
+
+
th
en
–
+
Sp
ec
ia
l
In
te
re
st
G
ro
up
In
fl
ue
nc
e
–
th
en
+
–
–
–
–
–
–
W
ea
k
In
st
itu
tio
ns
–
–
–
–
–
Po
lit
ic
al
C
oh
es
io
n
–
–
–
–
–
Po
lit
ic
al
In
st
ab
ili
ty
–
–
–
L
ea
de
rs
hi
p
of
D
er
vi
s
+
+
L
es
s
Ti
m
e
in
Po
w
er
+
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
th
ou
gh
t
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
ha
d
a
po
si
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct
on
pr
og
ra
m
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
–
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
th
ou
gh
t
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
ha
d
a
ne
ga
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct
on
pr
og
ra
m
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
+
th
en
–
(–
th
en
+)
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
th
ou
gh
t
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
ha
d
a
po
si
tiv
e
(n
eg
at
iv
e)
ef
fe
ct
on
pr
og
ra
m
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
w
hi
ch
tu
rn
ed
to
ne
ga
tiv
e
(p
os
iti
ve
)
th
er
ea
ft
er
150 O. Arpac, G. Bird
their responses according to their affiliation below). It may therefore be that our
sample is biased in some way. We did, however, try to ensure a reasonably
representative spread across all participants involved in the programs. We divided
the influences over implementation into four categories, again drawing on the extant
literature. These were: domestic political economy factors, IMF related factors,
external factors and initial conditions. But we also sub-divided each category into
more specific determinants as shown in Fig. 1.
Judging by the number of times each variable was referred to, domestic political
economy factors were perceived as dominating program implementation. Such factors
were perceived as more important than IMF-related factors, external factors and initial
economic factors combined. Within the domestic political economy factors, the influence
of interest groups was the most commonly mentioned variable influencing program
implementation. Government ownership, institutions and political cohesionwere, however,
also often perceived as being important determinants of implementation (see Fig. 1).
The results can be interpreted in various ways. Firstly, it may be seen from Table 4
that the significance of some variables differs between the 1999 and 2002 programs.
While initial economic factors and program design mattered in the 17th Stand-By, US
support, a favorable global environment and IMF commitment seem to have been
important in the case of the 18th Stand-By. Meanwhile, factors such as EU criteria,
interest groups and government ownership are important in both episodes. The distinct
difference between two consecutive programs in one country is testament to the need
for a subtle and nuanced approach to program implementation.
Secondly, an interesting picture emerges when we group the participants’ responses
by their affiliation. The bureaucrats’ and the IMF staff’s views on why programs
succeed or fail seem to be reasonably aligned with each other, while the politicians and
the representatives of interest groups seem to share views that differ from those of the
bureaucrats and IMF staff. For example, Finance Minister Sumer Oral did not accept
the weakening of the government’s ownership, or the impact of vested interests as a
reason for slippage in implementation. Bayram Meral, leader of the labour union
Determinants of Implementation
57%
17%
9%
17%
Domestic Political
Economy Factors
IMF Related Factors
External Factors
Initial Economic Factors
Domestic Political Economy Factors 31* 
Government Ownership & Commitment 5 
Country Ownership 3 
Special Interest Group Influence  7 
Weak Institutions 5 
Political Cohesion 5 
Political Instability 3 
Leadership of Dervis 2 
Less Time in Power 1 
IMF Related Factors 9 
IMF Commitment 5 
Size of IMF Loan 2 
(Ambitious) Program Design 2 
External Factors 5 
Favorable External Environment 2 
European Union Criteria 2 
US Support 1 
Initial Economic Factors 9 
Initial Economic Factors 3 
Crisis 6 
Fig. 1 Distribution of factors affecting the implementation of IMF programs in Turkey. * Number of
times each variable has been cited by participants
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confederation, saw the influence of interest groups as being important, but pointed
towards corruption and powerful business lobbies, rather than labour unions.
While our results suggest that the influence of special interest groups, a lack of
domestic ownership, a lack of political cohesion and weak institutions were seen as the
most significant factors exerting a negative effect on program implementation, it may be
noted that these factors are likely to be positively related to one another. The influence of
interest groups may, for example, be expected to be greater where a government lacks
cohesion and is uncommitted to the program.Where the government is stronger andmore
committed to it, special interest groups will be in a weaker position to exert influence.
Our findings also suggest that the IMF can influence implementation by its own
actions and commitment, by not being excessively ambitious in terms of what it sets
out to achieve, as well as by providing sufficient resources to make any preferred
program feasible. Again, some of these factors will be related to the domestic
political economy situation. For example, limited financial support will place a
greater weight on economic adjustment and this may in turn mean that certain
policies have to be included in the program in spite of it being accepted that they will
encounter strong domestic political resistance. Moreover, IMF commitment in terms
of resources may imply a willingness to be flexible and to make compromises.
External factors were generally seen as being less significant than those associated
with domestic political economy. But, once more, there could be interaction between
them, with, for example, the desire to join the EU making the government more
committed to reform than it would otherwise have been, and the global political situation
affecting the willingness of the US to offer support via the intermediation of the IMF.
In terms of initial conditions, there was a strong perception that the severe economic
crisis in 2001 enhanced the willingness across society to implement a program of
economic reform that would reduce the probability of future crises. However, the
relationship between initial economic conditions and implementation may be more
subtle than this suggests. Up to a point, it may be that deteriorating economic
circumstances make it more difficult to implement a program of reform, because there is
more to achieve. This will be particularly the case if there is no significant increase in the
commitment to reform. However, when the deterioration is sufficiently great to be
classified as a crisis, it may be that the increase in the commitment to reform outweighs
the additional challenges that the crisis creates. After a crisis has passed, two responses
are possible, with these being contingent on other factors. With a weak coalition
government exhibiting evaporating ownership, sectional interests may re-establish
themselves in an attempt to derive greater direct benefit from the economic recovery. By
contrast with a strong government committed to maintain the momentum of reform,
economic recovery may provide the justification for not reneging on policies. Both these
responses to IMF programs have been observed in Turkey.
Our interpretation of the qualitative evidence provided by our series of interviews
is that the implementation of IMF programs depends on contingent combinations of
factors in quite complex ways that are likely to change over time. They may even be
endogenous to the implementation and effects of the programs. Methodologically,
large sample regression analysis may identify relevant factors, broadly defined, but
will not capture the complexities and idiosyncrasies.
Our findings in Turkey are consistent with the large sample results but they also illustrate
the complexities and nuances that are not picked up at the higher level of aggregation.
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However, to what extent are our findings in Turkey applicable to other countries? To test
this we briefly examined six other case studies that our econometric analysis in Arpac et al.
(2008) identified as outliers in terms of the interruption of IMF programs; Kyrgyzstan,
Jordan, Guyana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia and the Philippines.
In the interests of brevity, we do not report our full findings for each of these
cases. However, they broadly confirm the findings of our Turkey case study. In
particular, they reveal the importance of powerful special interest groups opposed to
specific structural reforms and political fragmentation and instability in contributing
to the interruption of programs. The precise nature of these factors varies between
countries, but in general terms, they seem to be universally important.
These general messages carry implications for the design of IMF programs. First,
programs need to move beyond technical economics. The political environment in
which domestic policy is carried out needs to be taken into account. This could
involve contingency planning. The science of economics needs to be combined with
the art of the possible. Second, the Fund also needs to move beyond the loose and
ill-defined concept of ‘ownership’ in assessing the chances for implementation. It
needs to be fully informed of specific domestic political and institutional realities.
But it also needs to exploit what scope there is for using conditionality as a way of
supporting economic reform and institutional change. It needs to exploit any scope
that may exist for strengthening national ownership. The opportunities for such
influence may change through time and the Fund needs to take chances as and when
they present themselves. Moreover, the Fund needs to acknowledge that some
conditions will be politically easier to implement than others. Third, the nature of the
relationship between governments, national officials and the IMF needs to be one of
trust, confidence and flexibility. An institutional mechanism for seeking to replicate
the ‘Dervis effect’ identified in Turkey needs to be considered. This could involve
giving an enhanced role to the IMF’s Resident Representatives, reducing the
mobility of mission chiefs or ensuring continuity in other ways, and encouraging
country officials to spend time on secondment at the Fund.
6 Concluding Remarks
Since the early 2000s, increased attention has been paid to the implementation of
IMF programs. There has been research into the theory that lays behind it as well as
large sample regression analyses that have attempted to isolate its principal
determinants. However, as a methodological approach, regression analysis is
constrained by the availability of data. It will provide a broad rather than a detailed
picture. The complexities and nuances of implementation will be better revealed by
case studies, although the danger from these is that the degree of detail may obscure
the underlying messages. For this reason, the different methodologies need to be
pursued in tandem and to be seen as complementary rather than competitive.
Informed by the theoretical work and the results of available regression analyses
this paper has examined Turkey as a case study of the implementation of IMF
programs. The existing theoretical and empirical research allows a number of ideas
or hypotheses to be formulated that then help to structure the case study. Apart from
our own interpretation of events, our approach has been to conduct a series of
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interviews with those involved, including politicians, bureaucrats, representatives of
special interests and IMF personnel. From these interviews we have sought to extract
broad areas of consensus about the determinants of implementation.
We discover a reassuring consistency between the theory of implementation, the
results of large sample regression analysis and our case study findings. The theory
has stressed the relevance of ownership and the role of special interest groups. The
regression analyses have also emphasized issues of domestic political economy. In
the case of Turkey we are able to offer greater precision about how these factors
worked in detail and in practice. We are able to identify factors that are widely
perceived as being important. These include not only a range of domestic political
economy factors, but also the nature of IMF commitment and the existence of a
crisis. We point out, however, that these factors interact. Any complete explanation
of implementation is therefore likely to be a contingent one. We check whether our
findings are broadly generalizable not only by comparing them against the large
sample regression results achieved by us and by others but also by undertaking a
brief examination of other case studies (reported in Arpac et al. 2008).
The message that emerges is that we can be reasonably confident about the broad
categories of factors that affect the implementation of IMF programs. The relative
importance of these factors and the way in which they present themselves will,
however, vary from case to case. In designing programs that stand the best chance of
being implemented the IMF needs to be mindful of these factors and to address
them. We explore various ways of bringing this about. Although these may involve
significant institutional change for the Fund, the reward should be an improved
record of implementation and a strengthened perception of the IMF’s relevance and
effectiveness.
Appendix A: List of Interview Participants
Kemal Dervis- Head of the United Nations Development Programme, Former
Economy Minister of Turkey, 2001–2002. 30 min meeting on 16 February 2006, in
New York City.
Faik Oztrak- Former Undersecretary of Turkish Treasury, 2001–2002. 40 min
meeting on 13 September 2005, in Ankara.
Gazi Ercel- Former Governor of Central Bank of Turkey, 1996–2001. 80 min
meeting on 28 October 2005, in Istanbul.
Sumer Oral- Former Finance Minister of Turkey, 1999–2002. 120 min meeting on
14 April 2006, in Ankara.
Engin Akcakoca- Former Head of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
of Turkey, 2001–2003. 30 min meeting on 20 April 2006, in Washington D.C.
Bayram Meral- Member of Turkish Parliament, 2002 to date, Former Secretary-
general of the Turkish Confederation of Labor Unions, 1992–2002. 100 min meeting
on 13 April 2006, in Ankara.
Juha Kahkonen- Former Mission Chief of IMF to Turkey, 2001–2003. 40 min
meeting on 22 February 2006, in Washington D.C.
Carlo Cottarelli- Former Mission Chief of IMF to Turkey, 1999–2001. 50 min
meeting on 23 February 2006, in Washington D.C.
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Hugh Bredenkamp- Senior Resident Representative of IMF to Turkey, 2002 to
date, 90 min meeting on 13 April 2006, in Ankara.
David Goldsbrough- Former Deputy Director of the Independent Evaluation
Office of the IMF, 2001–2006. 40 min meeting on 21 February 2006, in Washington
D.C.
Marcelo Selowsky- Assistant Director of the Independent Evaluation Office of the
IMF, 2001 to date. 50 min meeting on 21 February 2006, in Washington D.C.
Note: In addition to above interviewees, academics Professor Ziya Onis, Nazif
Ekzen and Senior Tax Auditor of Turkey Ministry of Finance, Ahmet Veysel Ozer
provided their valuable comments.
Appendix B: Timeline of Events: 1999-2004
Table 5 Timeline of Events: 1999–2004
18 April 1999 Parliamentary Elections held. Coalition government of Democratic
Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party
(ANAP) came to power.
10 December 1999 Turkey’s candidacy for full membership was endorsed at the Helsinki Summit
of European Union
19 December 1999 A three year Stand-By Program agreed with the IMF (17th Stand-By
Agreement of Turkey)
10 April 2000 First Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
22 June 2000 Second Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
31 August 2000 The Banking Supervision and Regulation Agency became operational
20 November 2000 Banking crisis started
06 December 2000 The Supplemental Reserve Facility of the IMF was granted, and capital
outflow stopped. Third and Fourth Reviews of the 17th Stand-By completed
30 January 2001 Fifth Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
19 February 2001 Public dispute between President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit.
The short term interest rates rocketed to over 5,000%
23 February 2001 The exchange rate based stabilization program failed, the lira left to float
02 March 2001 Dervis appointed as the Minister of Economic Affairs
15 May 2001 “Strong Economy Program” announced by Dervis
03 May 2001 Sixth and Seventh Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
31 March 2001 State Minister Yuksel Yalova resigned over disagreements over Tobacco Law
26 June 2001 Eighth Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
17 July 2001 Minister Enis Oksuz resigned over disputes on Telekom privatization
31 July 2001 Ninth Review of the 17th Stand-By completed
20 November 2001 Tenth and last review of the 17th Stand-By completed
18 January 2002 New three-year Stand-By agreement with the IMF signed (18th Stand-By
agreement of Turkey)
03 April 2002 First Review of the 18th Stand-By completed
19 June 2002 Second Review of the 18th Stand-By completed
30 July 2002 Third Review of the 18th Stand-By completed
10 August 2002 Kemal Dervis resigned from the government
End August 2002 The legislation of financial sector reform, agricultural reform, and
privatization accomplished, satisfying both IMF conditionality and EU’s
Copenhagen criteria
03 November 2002 Parliamentary elections, the AKP majority government came to power
and declared they would continue implementing the Stand-By program
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